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SITUATIOX III 
INLAl"\TD STATE AT WAR 
States X and Y are at 'var. All states other than 
Btate D declare neutrality. State Y has no seacoast. 
T'he Black River is the common boundary of X and Y 
for 100 miles. Y has private merchant vessels and air-
craft under its flag. All vesseLs and aircraft of Y are 
rf'gistered at Yara, the capital of Y. Some of the mer-
chant vessels of Y have had their decks strengthened so 
that they may take on 6-inch guns. Some of these 
vessels have already installed these gull$. X has vessels 
and aircraft of the same character under its flag. 
(a) State A under its proclamation of neutrality ex-
cludes from its waters both types of vessels of X and Y, 
and all vessels of 'var and ve.ssels assimilated thereto. 
(b) State B refuses to admit vessels of X and Y with 
prize. 
(c) State C, adjoining state Y, refuses to permit an 
aircraft of Y to fly over its territory to a vessel of Y 
which is at sea. 
(d) State D, a maritime state, refuse.s to grant to 
either X or Y any rights 'vhich might flow from a decla-
ration of war or to accept any neutral obligations so far 
as aerial or maritime acts are concerned, on the ground 
that the 'var must be confined to the land territory of 
X andY. 
vVhat are the lawful rights of the parties-
(1) If the Black River is navigable to Yara? 
(2) If the Black River is not navigable to any point 
in state Y? 
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SOLUTION 
(a) State A 1nay lawfully in its proclamation of 
neutrality exclude all vessels of war and ve.ssels assimi-
lated thereto. This 'vould apply to armed merchant 
vessels, but ordinarily not to unarmed merchant vessels 
"~hether or not decks had been strengthened. 
(b) State B may lawfully refuse to admit vessels of 
".,.ar of X and Y 'vith prize except on account of unsea-
worthiness, stress of "~eather, or lack of fuel or supplies. 
(c) State C may lawfully refuse to permit aircraft or 
Y to fly over its territory to a vessel of Y '~hich is at sea. 
(d) State D 1nay not la,vfully refuse to grant to X 
and Y rights 'vhich might flow from a declaration o£ 
war or refuse to accept any neutral obligations so far 
as aerial or maritime acts are concerned though the 
geographical location of state D might make special 
regulations justifiable. 
NOTES 
Status in ti11ze of conflict.-The recognition of belliger-
ent and of neutral status has been of slo'v growth. The 
recognition of belligerent status and the gradual deter-
mination of the rights appertaining to this status can be 
traced before the sixteenth century but fron1 that time 
the recognition is clear and the determination of rights 
is n1arked. Gentilis (1588) defined "~ar as "a properly 
conducted contest of ar1ned public forces." (De jure belli, 
bk. I, ch. 2.) Since that time further atte1npts have been 
made to set bouncls to the status of belligerency, such as 
regards the beginning of '~ar in the Hague Convention 
III, 1907, providing that hostili6es between the contract-
ing parties should " not co1nmence without previous and 
explicit '~arning "and in Convention II providing against 
the en1ployment of force for the recovery of contract 
debts claimed from one govern1nent by another govern-
Inent as due to its nationals unless the debtor state fails 
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to respond to arbitral methods. These limitations upon 
time and cause of war have in practice seemed to n1eet 
general approval. Other attempts to limit the actual con-
duct of 'var have also been elaborated and even in the 
strain of the ti1ne of belligerency the conventions relating 
to the rules and customs of war on land and sea have 
in large 1neasure been respected and departures from these 
rules have been 'videly condemned. 
The laws of neutrality have been developing and many 
of these were embodied in the Hague conventions of 1899 
and 1907 and in the unratified Declaration of London 
of 1909. The Declaration of Paris of 1856 has received 
npproval of most of the states of the world. 
The rules of 'var and of . neutrality, written and un-
written, have been the subject of many court decisions 
'vhich serve to define the limits of lawful action. 
Diplomatic and other negotiations have also clarified 
the understanding and application of these rules. 
The rules and customs of war on land and sea at any 
particular period have not been found clearly applicable 
to every problem to which war might give rise, but con-
sidering difference in character and interests of the par-
ties at war, the effect has been generally approved as aid-
ing in progress to,vard removing of grounds of interna-
tional friction. Sudden and marked attempts to change 
established rules have unsettled conditions and multi-
plied the possibilities of friction and misunderstandings. 
International laws of war and of neutrality have tended 
to regard custom and precedent while recognizing the 
:force of changing conditions. 
It is true that at times a state has conceived that its 
interests might be better served by a course of action not 
in accord with internationalla w, but such a condition has 
not been regarded in practice or in the courts as sufficient 
ground for setting aside accepted law or for proclaiming 
a purpose of following a policy at wide variance with 
international law· though exceptional conditions have 
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been £ron1 time to tiine adn1itted as a1neliorating obli-
gations. 
lVar and neutrality.-,Vhen t'vo or 1nore states are at 
"~ar, other nonparticipating states are generally neutral. 
It is custon1ary for states to issue declarations o£ neutral-
ity, often outlining the course o£ conduct they propose to 
folio''· I£ the neutral states are strong, the course o£ con-
duct prescribed in the procla1nations w·ill probably be 
follo"·ed. I£ the neutral stat€s are ''eak or ti1nid or both, 
the belligerents "·ill tend to oYerride the prescriptions 
''heneYer it can be adYantageously clone. 
,, ... hile it is prestnnecl that states which take no part in 
the "·ar are neutral, it is not necessarily true that uncer-
tainty 1nay not arise in case a declaration does not exist, 
is "·ithdraw·n, or n1odified. 
There are rules "~hich are acceptell as generally bind-
ing, yet fron1 the nature of conditions in different areas 
special regulations 1nay be reasonable and neutrality reg-
ulations haYe Yaried greatly. 
The content of the idea o£ neutrality is not fixed and 
no concept of neutrality has existed sufficiently long to 
1nake its continuance assured. Grotius in his great treat-
ise, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, in 1625 gaYe little attention to 
the subject, but Bynkershoek early in the next century 
gaye a good definition of neutrality, a status 'vhich was 
then in fact unco1nn1on in interstate relations. ...t\.t the 
end of the eighteenth century the idea o£ neutrality ''as 
soine,Yhat further defined by the practice of the United 
States follo,ving the proclan1ation o£ ''r ashington o£ De-
ceinber 3, 1793, in ''hich. ''hile not 1nentioning "neu-
trality", he asserts that the United States " should 'vith 
sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct 
friendly and in1partial toward the belligerent po,Yers." 
N entrality ltn\s "·ere subsequently enacted by many 
states. The fundamental idea "·as as Bynkershoek said 
to be "'of neither party." 
It has been pointed out that in so1ne conditions an 
attitude of impartiality might be as vahJable as an alli-
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ance. T'his n1ight be the case 'vhen one of the belliger-
ents lacked entirely an article essential to the conduct of 
'var 'vhich a nearby neutral could furnish in unlimited 
quantity 'vithout risk of interference from the other 
belligerent. Such situations have given rise to discus-
sions in regard to the obligations of neutraLs to accom-
modate their conduct to the geographic relationship of 
the belligerents, so that. one might not be benefited more 
than the other. 
Protests have been 1nade by one belligerent to the 
effect that the nationals of a neutral should not sell to 
another belligerent goods 'vhich were of a nature to 
aiel in carrying on the 'var, particularly if the protesting 
belligerent was not in position to take advantage o.f such 
trade. Such protests have not been regarded a~ valid 
ns is evident in the correspondence during war. 
A circular of the Department of State of the United 
States early in the, World War, October 15, 1914, states: 
"In the first place it should be understood that, generally speak-
ing, a citizen of the United States ean sell to a belligerent goY-
ernment or its agent any article of commerce which be pleases. 
He is not prohibited from doing this by any rule of international 
law, b~· any treaty provisions, or by any statute of the United 
States. It makes no difference whether the articles sold are ex-
clusively for war purposes, such as firearms, explosives, etc., or 
are foodstuffs, clothing, horses, etc., for the use of the army or 
navy of the belligerent. 
"Furthermore, a neutral govern1nent is not compelled by in-
ternational law, by treaty, or by statute to prevent these sales 
to a belligerent. Such sales, therefore, by American citizens do 
not in the least affect the neutrality of the United States. 
"It is true that such articles as those mentioned are considered 
contraband and are, outside the territorial jurisdiction of a neu-
tral nation, subject to seizure by an enemy of the purchasing 
government, but it is the enemy's duty to prevent the articles 
n'aching their destination, not the duty of the nation whose citi-
zens have sold them. If the enemy of the purchasing nation hap-
l1ens for the time to be unable to do this that is for him one of 
the 1nisfortunes of war; the inability, however, hnposes on the 
r.eutral govern1nent no obligation to preYent the sale." (1916 
Naval 'Yar College, International Law Topics, p. 95.) 
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Status of Brazil, 1917.-Brazil by Decree of 1\ugust 4, 
1914, declared its neutrality, broke diplomatic relations 
·with Gennany, April 11, 1917, revoked its neutrality, 
June 4, 1917, and declared war against Germany, Octo-
ber 26, 1917. There 'vas uncertainty as to the status of 
Brazil during the period from June 4, 1917, when Brazil 
revoked its neutrality and October 26, 1917, when Brazil 
declared war. 'Ihe note on revocation of neutrality of 
June 4, 1917, as addressed by the Brazilian .A.mbassac1or 
to the Secretary of State of the United States was as 
follows: 
"WASHINGTON, June .1, 1917. 
"l\In. SECRETARY OF STATE: The President of the Republic has 
just instructed me to inform your excellency's GoYernment that 
he has approYed the law which revokes Brazil's neutrality in the 
war between the United States of America and the German Em-
pire. The Republic has thus recognized the fact that one of the 
Lelligerents is a constituent portion of th~ American Continent 
and that we are bound to that belligerent by traditional friend-
ship and the same sentiment in the defense of the vital interests 
of .America and the accepted principles of law. 
"Brazil ever \vas, and is now, free from warlike ambitions, and 
while it always refrained from showing any partiality in the 
European conflict, it could no longer stand unconcerned when 
the struggle involved the United States actuated by no interest 
whatever but solely for the sake of international judicial order 
and when Germany included us and the other neutral powers in 
the most violent acts of war. 
"'Vhile the comparative lack of reciprocity on the part of the 
.A.merican republics has hitherto divested the ~Ionroe Doctrine of 
its true character, permitting an interpretation based on the pre-
rogatiYes of their sovereignty, the present events, now bringing 
Brazil to the side of the United States at a critical moment in 
the history of the world, continue to impart to our foreign policy 
u practical form of continental solidarity; a policy, howeYer, 
\Yhich was also tha.t of the former regime whenever one of the 
other sister friendly nations of the American Continent was con-
cE·rned. ·The Republic has strictly obserYed our political and 
diploma tic traditions and remained true to the liberal principles 
in which the nation was nutured. 
"Thus understanding our duty, and taking the position indi-
cated by Brazil's antecedents and the conscience of a free people, 
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"hateYer developments the morrow may have in store for us, 
we shall conserve the constitution which governs us and which 
has not yet been surpassed in the guaranties due to the rights, 
lives, and property of foreigners. 
"In bringing the above stated resolution to your excellency's 
knowledge I beg you to be pleased to convey to your Government 
the sentiments of unalterable friendship of the Brazilian people 
and Government. 
DOMICIO DA GAMA." 
(Forc:gn Relations, 1917, Supplement I, p. 294.) 
In acknow I edging this communication £rom Brazil the 
ncting Secretary o£ State o£ the United States said: 
"\V ASHINGTON, June 16, 1917. 
"Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
y(;nr note of June 4, by whieh, ·in vursuance of instructions from 
the President of Brazil, you inform me of the enactment of a 
l:Jw revoking Brazil's declaration of neutrality in the war between 
the United States ancl Germany, and request me to convey to this 
Government the sentilnents of unalterable friendship of the 
Brazilian people and Government. 
"I have received with profound gratification this notification 
of the friendly cooperation of Brazil in the efforts of the United 
States to assist in the perpetuation of tlle prindples of free gov-
ernment and tl1e preservation of the agencies for the ameliora-
tion of the sufferings and losses of war, so slowly and toilfully 
built up during the emergence of mankind from barbarism. 
"Your Government's invaluable contribution to the cause of 
American solidarity, now rendered more important than ever as 
a protection to civilization and a means of enforcing the laws of 
hu1nanity, is highly appreciated by the United States. 
'' I shall be glad if you will be good enough to convey to the 
President, the Government, and the people of Brazil, the thanks 
of th is Government and people for their course, so consistent 
with the antecedents of your great and free nation and so im-
portant in its bearing on issues which are vital to the welfare of 
all the An1erican republics. 
"Requesting that you will also assure your Government and 
people of most cordial reciprocation by the Government and people 
of the United States of their assurances of friendship, always so 
greatly valued, and now happily rendered still warmer and closer 
by the action of Brazil, I avail my self [etc.]. 
(Ibid., p. 300.) 
FRANK L. POLl{.'' 
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Other South and Central 1-\1nerican States took action 
of a si1nilar nature supporting A1nerican solidarity. 
Son1e of these states 'vere unable to engage in aggressive 
hostilitie,s tow·ard Germany but did not 1naintain neu-
trality, and by pern1itting use of ports to the 1\.llies and 
by other conduct 1nanifested an attitude of passiYe 
hostility to,vard the Central Powers. 
Apparentl~r eYen in Brazil the breaking of eli plo1natic 
1·elations and the expression to,varcl the United States 
of "the senti1nents of unalterable friendship of the Bra-
zilian people and GoYerninent" did not inYoh·e definite 
participation in the ""ar for it "·as not till 1nore than 4 
1nonths later that Brazil declared 'Yar against Gern1any. 
The Depart1nent of State of the 1Jnited States announced 
on October 26, 1917, that it had been infor1ned that the 
Brazilian Senate at 6: 20 o'clock, Friday afternoon, Octo-
ber 26, 1917, had voted the declaration of 'var against 
Gern1any 'vhich had been approYed by the Chamber at 
3 o'clock. 
"A state of war hetween Brazil and the Gennan Empire, pro-
voked by the latter, is hereby recognized and proclaimed, and the 
President of the Republic, in accordance with the request con-
tained in his message to the National Congress, is hereby author-
ized to take such steps for the national defense and public safety 
as he shall consider adequate, to open the necessary credits and 
to authorize the credit operations required. All previous measures 
to the contrary are hereby revoked." (Ibid., p. 65.) 
There 'vas thus a period under neutrality regulations, 
August 4, 1914, to June 4, 1917, during a part of "·hich, 
April11 to June 11, 1917, diplomatic relations with Ger-
Inany 'vere severed. This period 'vas follo,ved by a 
period during 'vhich diplomatic relations were still sev-
ered and neutrality revoked and a recognition of the 
American "continental solidarity" 'vas announced and a 
spirit of friendship for the United States 'vas expressed 
but 'vithout declaration of 'var till October 26, 1917. 
Costa Rica in World War, 1914-18.-In spite of there-
fusal of the United States to recognize the revolutionary 
• 
.. 
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government o:f Tinoco in Costa Rica in 1917, Tinoco's 
Secretary o:f State :for Foreign Affairs informed the 
An1erican lVIinjster to Costa Rica o:f the attitude o:f the 
government o:f Tinoco, April 3, 1917: 
"Go\·ernment of Tinoco expresses desire to make known that 
without taking into aceount recognition on behalf of the Govern-
ment of the United States in any emergencies which arise be-
tween Germany and the Unite(J States lJy reason of the relations 
ill which these two countries fill(l themsel\·es t o-day, Government 
of Costa Rica not only is disposed to observe towards the United 
States a benevolent neutrality but also to prevent development 
upon its territory of any hostility again~t them." (Foreign Rela-
tiolls, U. S., 1917, SUJ1pleinent 1. p. 243.) 
Like Brazil, Costa Rica expressed in a note o:f April 9, 
1917, the idea o:f A1nerican "solidarity" and also offered 
the use o:f its ports and "·aters to the navy o:f the United 
States. Costa Rica. did not, ho"·ever, break diplomatic 
relations 'vith Germany till Septe1nber 1, 1917, and de-
clared 'var on ~1ay 24, 1918. 
State witlzout seacoast.-There has been some argu1nent 
that "·hen a state 'vithout a seacoast is at 'var 'vith a 
state having a seacoast, other maritime and neutral states 
should in their neutrality proclamations embody such re-
strictions as would equalize the conditions o:f the belliger-
ent states as respects com1nerce. Such a practice might 
i1nply that the neutral mariti1ne states should prohibit 
comn1erce in articles of contraband and destined to the 
belligerent maritime state "·hile territorially adjacent 
states might carry on comn1erce "·ith both belligerents. 
The doctrine o:f continuous yoyage has beco1ne too 'Yell 
established to easily adapt itself to such conditions. I:f 
the landlocked state is to be per1nitted to have its flag 
upon the sea and upon aircraft above the sea, it might 
create a privileged position :for the state " ·ithont a sea-
coast and this geography does not do. 
lVorld lVar treaties on fiags.-The Treaty o:f \Ter-
~· ailles, June 28, 1919, made provision :for the recognition 
of flags flo,yn by vessels o:f .states having no seacoast. 
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Article 273 stated: 
" In the case of vessels of the Allied or Associated Powers, all 
classes of certificates or documents relating to the vessel, which 
were recognized as valid by Germany before the war, or which 
may hereafter be recognized as valid by the principal maritilne 
States, shall be recognized by Germany as valid and as equivalent 
to the corresponding certificates issued to German vessels. 
"A similar recognition shall be accorded to the certificates and 
docun1ents issued ~o their vessels by the Governments of new 
States, whether they have a sea-coast or not, provided that such 
certificates and documents shall be issued in conformity with the 
general practice observed in the principal maritime States. 
"The High Contracting Parties agree to recognise the flag 
flown by the vessels of an Allied or Associated Power having no 
sea-coast which are registered at some one specified place situated 
in its territory ; such place shall serve as the port of registry of 
£Uch vessels." (1919 Naval \Var College, International Law 
Documents, p. 120.) 
By article 153 o£ the Treaty o£ Neuilly, November 27, 
1919, Bulgaria agrees to the same provisions a.s to the 
flag as those in the Treaty o£ Versailles. Article 225 o£ 
the Treaty o£ Saint-Germaine-en-Laye, September 10, 
1919, contained the same provision relating to Austria 
except that the words " any contracting party " 'vere 
substituted ~for the words " an Allied or Associated 
}"lower." This article was identical 'vith article 209 o£ 
the Treaty o£ Trianon, June 4, 1920, with Hungary. 
In article 102 o£ the Treaty o£ Lausanne, July 24, 1923, 
Turkey undertakes to adhere to the Barcelona Conven-
tion o£ April 20, 1921. 
Barcelona Convention, 1921.-The regulation o:f transit 
on land and sea was at the close o:f the World vVar re-
garded as a matter o:f.capital world importance. A con-
terence :for the purpose o£ reaching agreement on this 
subject 'vas held at Barcelona early in 1921, and on April 
20 reached the :following agreement as to the use o:f the 
national flag upon vessels belonging to states which have 
no seacoast : 
" The undersigned, duly authorised for the purpose, declare 
that the States which they represent recognise the flag flown by 
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the vessels of any State haYing no seacoast which are regis tered 
at some one specifiec1 place situated in its territory; such place 
shall serve as the port of registry of suc·h yessels. 
" Barcelona, .April the 20th, 1921, done in a single copy of which 
the English and French texts shall be authentic." (7 LNTS, p. 73; 
192-1 NaYal '\Var College, International Law Documents, p. 83.) 
Article XIV, lVaslzington Treaty, 192~.-Article XIV 
of the ~;Vashington Treaty of 1922 on the Limitation of 
Naval Arn1ament provided that: 
"No preparations shall be made in merchant ships in time of 
peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose 
of converting such ships into yessels of war, other than the neces-
sary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6-
inch (152 millimetres) calibre." (1921 Naval War College, Inter-
national Law Documents, p. 299.) 
This article did not receive much attention in the way 
of discussion in the ~Vashington Conference. It consti-
tutes a limitation upon construction in the ti1ne of peace. 
of vessels 'vhich might be converted in time of war. Such 
vessels 1night be treated by the opposing belligerent as 
potential auxiliary vessels, but there would not necessarily 
be any evidence apparent to a neutral ''hich '\vould be 
convincing as to the nature of the vessel. 
Under article XI'T a belligerent finding a 111erchant ves-
sel of an enemy, the decks of ·which are stiffened for the· 
1nounting of guns, would be co1npetent to decide upon the· 
treatment of such a vessel as a potential vessel of war. 
In the Second Hague Conference, 1907, the convention 
relating to the status o:f enemy merchant ships at the out-
break o:f hostilities stated in article 5 that the article 
J·elating to days of grace for enemy 1nerchant ships" does 
not affect merchant ships whose build shows that they· 
are intended for conversion into warships." This article· 
seems to be entirely reasonable, as a belligerent could not 
he expected to grant release to an enemy vessel which 
is in his po,ver and which i:£ released is adapted to con-
l'ersion into an enemy vessel o:f war. 
4448-36--6 
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.. :-\. belligerent \Youlcl not only haYe the right to inspect 
a 1nerchant vessel of an ene1ny in order to cleter1nine 
\Yhether it is adapted for conversion into a vessel of "'ar, 
but this \Yould also see1n to be an essential precaution. 
A neutral in the ordinary exercise of clue diligence 
'voulcl, ho,vever, be concerned \Yith the entrance and so-
journ \Yithin its \Vaters o.f ve,s.sels of belligerents \Yhich 
had already been converted into vessels of \Yar or \vhich 
fro1n external appearances \Yere to be used for hostile 
purposes. '_fhere is no obligation resting upon a. neutral 
to 1nake an exa1nination of the structural character of a 
ship before per1nitting it to enter its ports nor can a. 
neutral be expected to knO\Y the intention as to the ulti-
mate use of a ve..s~el \Yhich may enter or be in its ports. 
If a belligerent 'Tessel. \Yith guns 1nounted or fro1n its 
external appearan~e already adapted to engage in hos-
tilities, enters a neutral jurisdiction, the neutral 1nay 
prescribe or deny it such privileges as may correspond 
to the neutral's conception of its obligations or rights. 
The neutral ,state 1nay forbid the use of its waters to 
~~ vessels of \Var or vessels assi1nila.tecl thereto " and i£ 
pern1itting entrance, 1nay prescribe the conditions of 
SOJOUrn. 
It is also for the neutral state to determine \vhat ves-
.sels are assi1nilated to vessels of war. The attitude of a 
neutral state 1nay depend upon many circumstances, such 
uS geographical proxi1nity, commercial relations, etc. If 
the merchant vessels of X, having decks stiffened for the 
1nounting of guns, have all been built in neutral state X, 
it may be prestuned that state N n1ay kno\v of this or 
1nay have it brought to its attention. By article XIV 
of the ''Tashington Convention, the purpose of stiffening 
-of decks is stated and state N 1nay be desirous of a void-
ing any act or failure to act \Yhich n1ight itnply a non-
iulfilln1ent of neutral obligations. 
Ad1nission of vessels of war.-Hall in referring to a 
Yessel converted by go,Tenunent co1nmission into a public 
vessels says : 
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" But though, if a Yessel so commissioned is admitted at all 
,vithin the ports of the neutral, it n1ust be accorded the full priv-
ileges attached to its public character, there is no international 
u:-:age which dictates that ships of war shall be allowed to enter 
foreign ports, except in cases of imminent danger or urgent need. 
It is fully recognised that a state may either refuse such admis-
sion altogether, or 1nay limit the enjoyn1ent of the privilege by 
whatever regulations it n1ay choose to lay down" (International 
J_..aw, 8th edition, p. 746.) 
Regul(J)tion of entrance of vessels of toar.-Neutrals 
have 1naintainecl the right to regulate the entrance and 
sojourn of vessels of 'var. rfhe regulations have SOllle-
times been dra 'vn up before the 'var and sometilnes pro-
claimed after the 'var. Objections have been raised to 
regulations proclain1ed after the 'var but these have not 
been sustained because a neutral has the right to take 
action for preserving its neutrality. 
Identic rules 'vere agreed to by Denmark, Norway, and 
s,veden in Dece1nber 1912 as follows: 
'' 'Var ve~~els of lJelligerent powers are permitted to enter ports 
.and roadsteads as well as other territorial waters of the kingdom . 
.At the san1e time athnission is subject to the exception~, restric-
tions, and conditions which follow: 
"1. (a) It is forbidden belligerent war vessels to enter the 
ports and roadsteads of war, which have been proclaimed as such. 
" (b) It is also forbiddent such vessels to enter territorial 
waters whose entrances are closed by submarine tnines or other 
n1eans of defense. 
" (c) The King reserves the right to forbid under the sa1ne 
conditions to the two belligerent parties, access to other Norwe-
gian ports or roadsteads and other defined parts of the interior 
Norwegian waters, when special circumstances demand and for 
safeguarding the soYereign rights of the kingdom and to tnaintain 
its neutrality. 
'' (d) The King also reserves the right to forbid access to ports 
and roadsteads of the kingdom to belligerent war vessels which 
lw Ye neglected to conform to rules and prescriptions promulgated 
ty the competent authorities of the kingd01n and which have vio-
1f,ted its neutrality." (1917 Naval 'Var College, International 
Law Documents, p. 184.) . 
Vessels assi1nilated to vessels of w~al·.-The treatment 
of vessels assi1nilatecl to vessels of 'var has varied in 
76 IXLAXD STATE AT 'VAR 
many 'va.ys and in different states. The practice in re-
gard to armed merchant vessels was somewhat fully 
considered at the Naval 'Var College in 1927 (1927 Naval 
"\~Var College, International La'v Situations, pp. 
73-105), showing wide divergence in practice and a drift 
tow·ard treating armed merchant ve.ssels under the same 
rules as vessels of 'var. 
Many states put restrictions upon the entrance of 
vessels which might from their equipment participate in 
the 'var either directly by engaging in hostilities or in-
directly by supporting the belligerents as auxiliaries. 
Certain .states permitting entrance of armed merchant 
Yessels restricted such armament to defensive armament, 
hut found difficulty in making the distinction between 
snch vessels as were intended .for purposes of war and 
those 'vhich were not so intended. So many contro-
versies arose on this 1natter that the safe course seemed to 
be to treat armed vessels as vessels of 'var. 
The Netherlands regulations of August 5, 1014, issued 
before the controversy had becon1e acute, state: 
"ARTICLE 4. No "·arships or ships assimilated thereto belong-
ing to any of the belligerents shall haYe access to the said 
territory. " 
An earlier procla1nation of JuJy 30, 1914, stated: 
"ARTICLE 2. As long as the Order Inentionecl in Article I 
(Royal Orcler of October 30, 1009) is not in force, it is forbidden 
to war ships or similar Yessels of foreign powers to enter the 
Netherlands territorial waters from the sea or to remain therein. H 
Of course regulations did not exclude .ships in distress. 
Territorial waters.-The proclan1ation excluding ves-
sels of 'var and vessels assin1ilated thereto from terri-
torial waters has been further complicated by varying at-
titudes upon the extent of territorial waters. "\Vhile 
some stah~s have accepted the 3-mile lin1it, other states 
have maintained claims to 4, 5, 6, 10, or 1uore 1niles as the 
proper line. In the early part of the "'\Vor ld War the 
Italian Ambassador at Washington in a note to the Sec-
retary of State said on November 6, 1914: 
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" By note of August 13 last the Royal En1bassy had the houor 
to inforn1 your excellency that under a Royal decree of the Gth 
Df that month the limit of territorial waters, for the purposes of 
neutrality, had be€n set at six nautical miles, and certain special 
rules were laid down for the delimitation of such territorial 
waters in bays, bights, and gulfs in accordance with Article 2 of 
said decree. In a subsequent note of September 8 the Royal 
Embassy quoted for your excellency's due information the text 
of the provisions contained in the said article of the Royal decree. 
Your excellency was pleased to acknowledge the said communi-
cations by your notes of August 17 and September 19-. 
"Whether because of the fact that the limits of the marginal 
sea are not regulated by international conventions or general rules 
of international law-thus leaving every state at liberty to fix 
them within the · sphere of its own sovereignty without subjecting 
its decision to the recognition of the other states-or because of 
the fact that no comment was made by your excellency on the 
Royal Embassy's con1munications, His ~fajesty's Governn1ent 
kno\vs that no objections are made by the Federal Government 
to the six-mile limit set by us on our territorial waters for the 
vurpose of neutrality. 
"Yet, with a view to removing any possible uncertainty, His 
:Majesty's Government would be very thankful for a declaration 
which would explicitly convey acceptance by the Federal Govern-
Inent of the decision as adopted. And, in compliance with in-
structions I have just received on the subject, I have the honor 
to apply to your excellency's tried courtesy for such a declara-
tion." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1914, Supplement, p. 665.) 
l'his note n1ade it necessary :for the United States to 
reply or tacitly to admit that 6 1niles n1ight be a lawful 
claim to jurisdiction. This the United States was un-
'villing to do and the reply :from the Acting Secretary o:f 
State on N ove1nber 28, 1914, was as :follows: 
" I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your excellency's 
note of November 6, 1914, having reference to your previous notes 
of August 13 and September 8 last, the first of which notes con-
tained announcement that by a Royal decree of the Italian Gov-
-ernment, dated August 6, 1914, the limits of its territorial waters 
were set at six nautical miles from the shore, and the latter of 
which notes quoted the text of article 2 of that decree, prescrib-
iug rules for the determination of the territorial waters in the 
bays, bights, and gulfs which indent the Italian shore. Of these 
notes I had the honor to acknowledge receipt, respectively, on 
August 17 and September 19 last gone. 
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"In ~·our note of November 6 your excellency says that in order 
to remove any possible uncertainty respecting the position of this 
GoYernn1ent, you will appreciate an explicit declaration on behalf 
of the United Stntes accepting the decision of the Italian Gon-'rn-
went as en1bodied in the Royal decree refen·ed to. 
"I a1n con1pelled to infol'ln your excellen~y of my inability to 
ntcept the princivle of the Royal decree in so far as it nu1~· under-
take to extend the limits of the territorial waters beyond three 
nautical mile~ from the Inain shore line and to extend thereover 
the jurisdiction of the Italian GoYernment. 
"An examination into the question involved leads to the con-
<·1usion that the territorial jurisdiction of a nation over the 
waters of the sea which wash its shore is now generally recoguize(l 
b.r the principal nations to extend to the distance of one 1narine 
l(lague or three nautical n1iles, that the Government of the United 
States appears to haYe uniformly supportE·d this rule, and that 
the right of a nation to extend, by domestic ordinance, it~ juris-
dktion beyond thi~ lin1it bas not been acqtri€sced in hy the Gov-
erninent of the United States. 
" There are certain reasons, brought fonvard fron1 time to time 
in the discus~ion of this question and adyanced by writer~ on 
international law, why the maritime nations might deem the 
way clear to extend this determined limit of three miles, in view 
of the great illllH'OYenlent in gunnery and of the extended dis· 
tance to which, from the shore, the rights of nations could be 
l1efended; but it seems rnanife~tly in1portant that such a con-
struction or change of the rule should be reduced to a precise prop-
u:;:ition and should then receive in son1e 1nanner reciprocal ac-
knowledgnlent from the principal maritime vowers; in fine, that 
the extent of the open or high seas should better be the re~ult of 
~o1ne concerted understanding by the nations who~e ve:ssels sail 
tllem than be left to the deter111ination of each particular nation, 
iutluenced by the intere~ts which nuly be peculiar to it." (Ibid., 
p. 665.) 
Internmtent of the '~Farn ", 1915.-Jnst "·hat vc.ssels 
1uay be included in the category of vessels assi1nilated to 
Yessels of ''ar has not been specifically determined. 
Armament or flag n1ight be the deter1nining factor in 
sotne cases, and cond net 1night be considered in other 
cases. Use 'Yas offered as the ground of intern1nent of the 
FaPn in 1915. The Secretary of State, in reply to a com-
nlunication of the British Ambassador requesting the re-
l(~ase of the Farn as being a prize brought into San J nan 
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and not departing at once in accord with article 21 of 
Hague Convention XIII, said: 
" I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excel-
lency~s note of the 26th ultimo in relation to the steamship· 
Farn, or I<D-3, which has been interned in the port of San Juan, 
Porto Rico, as a tender to a belligerent fleet. The Department is 
ndvisecl that the Farn left Cardiff about September 5, 1914, for 
1\lontevideo, with a clause in her charter to deliver coal to war-
ships if they so desired. Though, as you state, the vessel was· 
not etnployed as a collier, or otherwise, in the Adtniralty service, 
this fact would not in the opinion of the Departn1ent affect her 
status at the time of internment if she indeed acted as a collier 
or auxiliary to a belligerent fleet. It is understood that the 
Farn was a British tnerchant vessel; that she had on board a 
cargo of Cardiff coal atnounting to s01ne 3,000 tons; that she was 
captured by the Gennan cru:.ser J(arl.<:sruhe on October 5; that 
the cruiser placed a nrize crew and officers on board; and that 
notwithstanding the known practice of the J(a.rlsrultc to sink 
her enemy prizes, the vessel had been at sea continuously since 
the date of capture until she put into the port of San Juan on 
January 12 last for provisions and water. The Department be-
lieves that the only reasonable conclusion in the circumstances, 
is that betwe-en October 5 and January 12 the Fant was used as 
a tender to German warships. It appears obvious that a bel-
ligerent may use a prize in its sen·ice and that the prize there-
by becomes stamped with a character dependent upon the nature 
of the service. It is upon this view of the case that the United 
States Government concluded to treat the vessel as a tender, 
which character accords with her presumed service to the Ger-
man fleet." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1915 Supplement, p. 823.) 
Ar1ned 1nerchant ?.,essel.-The problem of the arn1ed 
merchant vessels perplexed neutrals cltu~ing the \\T orld 
\Var and "·as the. subject of 1nany exchanges of diplo-
Illatic notes. A proposal w·hich brought the issue clearly 
to the attention of the belligerents ·was 1nade by Secre-
tary Lansing in ,Jan nary 1916. The coininunication of 
January 18~ 1916, which 'vas sent to the British, French, 
and Russian ambassadors and the Belgian 1ninister dis-
eusses the use of subn1arines in the war up to that date. 
This document, 'vhich has been often cited, contains con1-
n1ents on what Secretary Lansing tern1s " a doubtful legal 
right " and expresses the hope that the belligerents n1ay 
so INLAND STATE AT 'V AR 
ngree to a reciprocal and reasonable arrangmnent 'vith 
view to ending subn1arine attacks upon merchant vessels: 
" In order to bring submarine warfare within the general rules 
of international law and the principles of humanity without de-
stroying its efficiency in the destruction of commerce, I believe 
that a formula may be found which, though it may require slight 
modifications of the practice generally followed by nations prior 
to the employment of submarines, will appeal to the sense of jus-
tice and fairness of all the belligerents in the present war. 
'' Your excellency will understand that in seeking a formula or 
rule of this nature I approach it of necessity from the point of 
view of a neutral, but I believe that it will be equally efficacious 
in preserving the lives of all non-combatants on merchant Yessels 
of belligerent nationality. 
"l\Iy comments on this subject are predicated on the following 
propositions : 
1. A non-combatant bas a right to traverse the high seas in a 
merchant Yessel entitled to fly a belligerent flag and to rely upon 
tl1e obserYance of the rules of international law and principles of 
humanity if the vessel is approached by a na Yal vessel of another 
belligerent. 
2. A merchant vessel of enemy nationality should not be at-
tucked without being ordered to stop. 
3. An enemy merchant vessel, when ordered to do so by a 
belligerent submarine, should immediately stop. 
4. Such vessel should not be attacked after being ordered to 
stop unless it attempts to flee or to resist, and in case it ceases 
to flee or resist, the attack should discontinue. 
5. In the event that it is impossible to place a prize crew on 
board of an ene1ny merchant vessel or convoy it into port, the 
vessel may be sunk, provided the crew and passengers have been 
removed to a place of safety. 
"In complying with the foregoing propositions which, in my 
opinion, embody the principal rules, the strict observance of which 
will insure the life of a non-combatant on a merchant vessel which 
is intercepted by a submarine, I am not unmindful of the obstacles 
which would be met by undersea craft as commerce destroyers. 
"Prior to the year 1915 belligerent operations against ene1ny 
cc.mmerce on the high seas hp.d been conducted with cruisers 
-currying heavy ar1naments. Under these conditions international 
law appeared to permit a merchant vessel to carry an arma1nent 
for defensive purposes without losing its character as a private 
.commercial Yessel. This right seems to haYe been 11:·edicatcd on 
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the superior defensive strength of ships of war, and the limita-
tion of armament to have been dependent on the fact that it 
could not be used effectively in offense against enemy naval ves-
sels, while it could defend the merchantman against the generally 
inferior armament of piratical ships and privateers. 
"The use of the submarine, however, has changed these rela-
Oons. Comparison of the defensive strength of a cruiser and a 
submarine shows that the latter, relying for protection on its 
power to submerge, is almost defenseless in point of construction. 
Even a merchant ship carrying a small caliber gun would be able 
to use it effectively for offense against a submarine. Moreover, 
pirates and sea rovers have been swept from the n1ain trade chan-
nels of the seas, and privateering has been abolished. Conse-
quently, the placing of guns on merchantmen at the present day 
uf submarine warfare can be explained only on the ground of a 
purpose to render merchantmen superior in force to submarines 
and to prevent warning and visit and search by them. Any arma-
ment, therefore, on a merchant vessel would seem to have the 
c'!Jaracter of an offensive armament. 
"If a submarine is required to stop and search a merchant 
VPSsel on the high seas and, in case it is found that she is of 
enemy character ancl that conditions necessitate her destruction, 
to remove to a place of safety all persons on board, it would 
not seem just or reasonable that the submarine should be com-
pelled, while complying with these requirements, to expose itself 
to almost certain destruction by the guns on board the merchant 
vessel. 
" It would, therefore, appear to be a reasonable and recipro-
cally just arrangement if it could be agreed by the opposing belli-
gerents that submarines should be caused to adhere strictly to 
the rules of international law in the matter of stopping and search-
ing merchant vessels, determining their belligerent nationality, 
and removing the crews and passengers to places of safety before 
sinking the vessels as prizes of war, and that merchant vessels 
of belligerent nationality should be prohibited and prevented from 
carrying any armament whatsoever. 
" In presenting this formula as a basis for conditional declara-
tions by the belligerent governments, I do so in the full conviction 
tlJat your Government will consider primarily the humane pur-
pose of saving the lives of innocent people rather than the in-
sJstence upon a doubtful legal right which may be denied on 
account of new conditions." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1916, Sup-
plement, p. 146.) 
The American proposition was not adopted. 
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.Adnd~sion of sub1narines.-The British Govern1nent 
set forth its opinion in regard to the closing of neutral 
ports to sub1narines in a com1nunication to the Secretary 
of State on July 3, 1916: 
"The ene1ny submarines have been endeavouring for nearly 
eighteen months to prey upon the Allied and neutral com1nerce, 
and throughout that period enemy governments haYe never 
claimed that their subn1arines were entitled to obtain supplies 
fr01n neutral ports. This must llaYe been clue to the fact that 
they thought they would be 1net with a refusal and that hos-
pitality could not be claimed as of right. The difficulty of know-
ing the movements or controlling the subsequent action of the 
submarines renders it impossible for the neutral to guard against 
any breaches of neutrality after the submarine has left port and 
justifies the neutral in drawing a distinction between surface 
ships and submarines. The latter, it. is thought, should be 
treated on the same footing as seaplanes or other aircraft and 
should not be allowed to enter neutral ports at all. This is the 
rule prescribed during the present war by Norway and Sweden . 
. Another point of distinction between surface ships and sub-
marines should be borne in mind. A surface Yessel demanding 
the hospitality of a neutral port runs certain inevitable risks; 
its whereabouts bec01ne l{nown and an enemy cruiser can await 
its departure frOin port. This and similar facts put a check on 
the abuse by belligerant surface ships of neutral hospitality. No 
such disadvantages limit the use to which the Germans might 
put neutral ports as bases of supplies for submarine raiders. 
" For these reasons, in the opinion of His :Majesty's Govennnent, 
1f any enemy sub1narine attempts to enter a neutral port, per-
lllission should be refused by the authorities. If the submarine 
enters it should be interned unless it bas been driven into port by 
necessity. In the latter case it should lJe allowed to depart as 
soon as necessity is at an end. In no circumstances should it be 
allowed to obtain supplies. 
"If a subinarine should enter a neutral port flying the mercan-
tile flag His :l\lajesty's Government are of opinion that it is the 
,duty of the neutral authorities concerned to enquire closely into 
its right to fly that flag, to inspect the Yessel thoroughly a1ul, in 
the event of torpedoes, torpedo tubes or guns being found on board, 
to refuse to recognise it as a merchant ship." (Foreign Helations, 
U. S., 1916, Supplement, p. 766.) 
It is difficult to reconcile this position, if taken in re-
gard to a 1nerchant sub1narine 'vith the attitude of the 
-British to,vard other ar1ned 1nerchant vessels. In August 
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1916 the Allied Govern1nent in identic notes stated to 
the United States that: 
'' Submarine vessels should be excluded fro1n the benefit of the 
rules hitherto recognized by the law of nations regarding the 
admission of vessels of war or merchant vessels into neutral 
waters, roadsteads, or ports, and their sojourn in them. 
"Any belligerent submarine entering a neutral port should be 
·detained there." (Ibid., p. 770.) 
In its reply the United States Govern1nent said: 
"In the opinion of the Government of the "United States the 
Allied powers have not set forth any circun1stances, 11or is the 
Government of tlle United States at vresent aware of any circum-
stances, coneerning the use of war or n1erchant submarines which 
would render the existing rules of international law inapplicable 
to them. In view of this fact and of the notice and warning of 
the Allie(l powers announced in their metnoranda under acknowl-
edgment, it is incu1nbent upon the Government of the United 
States to notify the GoYernments of France, Great Britain, Russia, 
~J.nd Japan that, so far as the treatment of either war or tnerchant 
}'Ubtnarines in American waters is concerned, the GoYernment of 
the United States reserYes its liberty of action in all respect~ an<l 
\Viii treat such vessels as, in its opinion, becomes the action of a 
power which may he said to ha ,.e taken the first steps toward 
establishing the 1n·inciples of neutrality and which for over a 
century has maintained those princi})les in the tra<litional spirit 
und with the high sense of iml)hrtiality in which the;\· \vere con-
ceived." (Ibid, p. 771.) 
N or,vay and other po,vers had indicated that they also 
1·egarded the existing principle of international la'' as 
applicable to subn1a1;ines. 
Am.er-ican OJY/nion, January 1917.-A case showing that 
the United States 'vas endeaYoring to clarify its position 
en anned 1nerchant vessels arose in consequence of the 
action of the French S. S. J.1fississippi in late 1916. This 
js set forth in a letter fro1n the Secretary of State to the 
French An1bassador: 
""\VASHINGTON, January 6, 191''i. 
'' ~IY DEAR :i\IR. A~IBASSADOR: It has been brought to this De-
rmrtinent's attention thn.t on NoYember 8 last the French S. S. 
Jlississippi tired on a submarine in the English Channel prior to 
warning or attack hy the sub1narine. This report is virtually con-
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firmed by the affidavits of the first lieutenant, the second captain, 
aud the second lieutenant of the vessel, which is now at the port 
of New York. The following statement frOin the nffidaYit of the 
second lieutenant is pertinent: 
" ' l\Iy station ·was at the stern in command of the gun, and the 
c:.1ptain told me to be prepared to fire at the submarine at a range 
of about 4,000 yards. The captain sent the second captain to the 
stern to instruct me to fire one shot when he gave the signal. The 
captain gave the signal by raising his hand and I fired one shot, 
ned reloaded the gun and remained ready to fire another.' 
"The facts before the Department indicate that this action 'vas 
initiated by the Mississippi and therefore offensive in its nature-
a circumstance which might well be regarded as placing this vessel 
in the class of offensively armed ships, to which this Government 
is firmly convinced the hospitality usually granted to merchnnt-
Iaen in United States ports 1nay be denied. As, however, this is 
the first instance of the sort which has come to my Government's 
notice, and out of regard to the possibility of a mistake in this 
case, the vessel will be allowed to depart as usual, on your Gov-
ernment's assurance. I 'vould, however, be remiss in my duty 
if I did not bring this case to your notice with the request that 
it be brought to your Governn1ent's attention, with the opinion 
oi my Government, as herein expressed. 
"In this relation I attach a copy of instructions said to have 
been issued by your Government to merchant sea captains, and in 
force in October and November last on French vessels. These 
instructions (if genuine) lay the armament on merchant vessels 
of France open at least to the inference that its purpose is for 
offensive attack on submarines of the enemy. I have, therefore, 
to ask that you be good enough to advise me nt the earliest mo-
ment as to whether these instructions have been issued to the 
masters of French merchant vessels by your Government and are 
now in force. I would be grateful if you could inform me on 
these points as soon as possible. 
"I am, etc. ROBERT LANSING." 
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1917, Supplement I, p. 544.) 
As the United States entered the 'var within a few 
n1onths there see1ns to have been no ans,ver to this com-
Inunication. 
Prize and neutral JJOJ'fs.-In early days as the la,vs of 
neutrality 'Yere deYeloping, the practice in regard to re-
ception of prizes in neutral ports varied. Treaties em-
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bodying differing principles ·were negotiated :fron1 ti1ne 
to time. 
In the case of the Appa1n, a British yessel captured in 
1917 off the 'vest coast of Africa by the German cruiser 
JJJ oe1oe, 'vas brought into Ha1npton Roads, an American 
port n1ore than 3,000 1niles distant. The German con ten-
tion was that the bringing in and keeping of the Appant-
in an American port 'vas justified under article 10 of the 
treaty o:f 1799 bet,veen the United States and Prussia. 
(8 U. S. Stat., 172.) In the decision upon the case o:f 
the Appam, the Supre1ne Court said: 
Article 19 of the treaty of 1799, using the translation adopted 
by the A1nerican State Department, reads as follows: 
"The vessels of war, public and private, of both parties, shall 
rarry [conduire] freely, wheresoever they please, the vessels and 
effects taken [pris] from their enemies, without being obliged to 
pay any duties, charges, or fees to officers of admiralty, of the 
customs, or any others; nor shall such prizes [prises] be arrested, 
searched or put under legal process, when they come to and enter 
tl1e ports of the other party, but may freely be carried [conduites] 
0ut again at any time by their captors [le vaisseau preneur] to 
the places expressed in their commissions, which the commanding 
officer of such vessel [le dit vaisseau] shall be obliged to show. 
(But conformably to the treaties existing between the United 
States and Great Britain, no vessel [vaisseau] that shall have 
made a prize [prise] upon British subjects shall have a right to 
shelter in the ports of the United States, but if [il est] forced 
therein by tempests, or any other danger, or accident of the sea, 
they [il sera] shall be obliged to depart as soon as possible.)" 
The provision concerning the treaties between the United States 
and Great Britain is no longer in force, having been mnitted by 
the treaty of 1828 [8 Stat. L. 378]. See Compilation of Treaties in 
Force, 1904, pages 641 and 646. 
"\Ve think an analysis of this article makes manifest that the 
permission granted is to vessels of war and their prizes, which 
are not to be arrested, searched, or put under legal process when 
they come into the ports of the high contracting parties, to the 
end that they may be freely carried out by their captors to the 
places expressed in their commissions, which the comn1anding 
officer is obliged to show. 'Vhen the Appmn can1e into the Ameri-
can harbor she was not in charge of a vessel of war of the Gennan 
Empire. She was a merchant vessel, captured on the high seas 
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and :::-ent into the Amerkan 11ort with the intl'ntion of being kept 
there indefinitely, and without any means of ll•aYillg that port for · 
another, as contemplated in the treaty, and required to be shown 
ii1 the eommission of the Yt~ssel bringing in the prize. Certainly 
:-:ueh use of a neutral port is Yerr far from that contemplated by 
a treaty which made lH'OYision only for temvorar;r asylum for cer-
tain purposes, and can not be held to imply an intention to make 
of an American port a harbor of refuge for captured prizes of a 
belligerent GoYernnwnt. ""'e ean not aYoid the conclusion that in 
thus 1naking use of an American port there was a clear breach of 
the neutral rights of this GoYernment, as recognized under lH'in-
dple~ of internationa I law goYerning the obligations of neutral~, 
and that such use of one of our ports was in no wise sanctioned 
by the treaty of 179!>. (242 U. S. Supren1e Court Re110rts, 124; 
!'Pe also 1922 Kaval ""'ar College, International Law Deeisions, v. 
160.) 
In general during the ,.Vorlcl 'Var nentral states pro-
hibited the entrance of prize to their territorial "TatPrs 
c·xcept in case of distress, shortage of fuel or coal. 
XIII Hague Convention, 1907, provided in regard to 
thE.l entrance of prize to neutral 'vaters. and the Alneri-
can attitude tolvard these proYisions "~as stated in the 
case of the Appa1n cited above. 
'' This policy of the American Govern1nent was e1nphasized in 
its attitude at The Hague Conference of 1907. Article 21 of Tlle· 
Hague treaty lH'OYides : 
'''A 1n·ize may only be brought into a neutral port on account 
of un~ea worthinPss, stress of wen ther, or want of fuel or JH'oyi-
sions . 
. , 'It n1u::;t lea Ye as soon as the circumstances which ju~tified 
i1~ entry are at an end. If it does not, the neutral power must 
order it to leaYe at once; should it fail to obey, tlw neutral power 
must etn}l1oy the means at its dis11osal to relea~e it with its 
1 ,ffieers and crew and to intern the lH'ize crew.' 
''Article 22 proYides: 
"'A neutral power tnust, similarly, release a prize brought int(} 
(:ne of its ports under circumstances other than those referred to 
in article 21.' 
"To these article~, adherenee was given by Belgium, ]!.,ranee, 
Au:-;tria-IIungary, Gernuu1~·, the United States, alHl a number of 
•:the1· na tioll~. They were 11ot ratified by the British Government. 
This GoYennnent refused to adhere to article 23, \Vhich IH'oYides: 
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" 'A neutral vower may allow vrizes to enter its port~ and 
roadsteads, \Yhether under conYoy or not, when they are brought 
tLere to be sequestrated pending the decision of a prize court.' " 
(1022 XaYal War College, International Law Decisions, v. H>D.) 
Brazil in lVorld lVar, 1914-18.-By decree no. 11,03"{ 
0£ .... t\..ugu,st 4, 1914, Brazil announced detailed rules of 
neutrality. The rules "'ere reaffir1ned as other states 
later joined in ""ar. In earlier 'yars, Brazilian rnles 
have also been very co1nprehensive. During the ''T orld 
'Var, Brazil fro1n time to ti1ne n1odified the regulations . 
..._~rticle 20, which 'Yas issued on ... -\..ugust 4, 1914, read as 
:follows: 
·'The ca11tures nml1e hy a lJelligerent may only he lJrought to a 
Brazilian port in ca~e of nns.eawortiliness, stress of \\"('ather. lack 
of fuel or food vrm·i~ions, and also u1uler tlw eon<lition:-; pro-
Yided hereinbelo,,· in Article 21st. 
"The prize n1ust depart as soon as the eause or causes of her 
arrintl cea~e. Failing that d('va rture, the Brazil" an authorit) 
"·ill notify the commander of tile vrize to le~n·e at once. atHl. if 
not obeyed, will tal{e the necessary measures to ha,·e the prize 
released with her officers and crew, and to intern the prize crew 
placed on board by the captor. 
" Any prize entering a Brazilian port or harbor, except under 
the aforesaid four conditions, will be likewise released." ( 1916 
XaYal """ar College, International Law Topics, p. 1:3.) 
By degree no. 11.093 of August 24, 1914, a fifth condi-
tion of entrance 'vith prize was published a,s follo,vs: 
" In any one of the hy11othe~e!-' of tile Artieles 20 and :21 tile 
Brazilian Gm·ernment re:-:erYes to itself tile right to demand the 
disembarking fron1 on boanl the prizes of the 1nercbandise 
destined to Brazil.'' (1017 Xan1l ""ar College, International 
La \Y Doctnnen ts, p. 6:2.) 
Other changes in Brazilian neutrality rules "·ere also 
announced. 
League of 1Vation.s and co1nrJnwnications.-"C"nder article 
23 of the CoYenant of the League of :Kations. the Inenl-
bers of the League of X ations~ subject to the proYisions . 
0£ international conYentions~ agree that they: 
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'· (e) wHI make provisions to secure and maintain freed urn of 
comJnunieations anll of transit and equitable treatment, for the 
commerce of all members of the League." 
To carry out this agree1nent and follo,ving certain pre-
luninary investigations, the first General Conference on 
Com1nunications and Transit 'vas held at Barcelona on 
l\farch 10 to April 20, 1921. 
The .A.dvisory and Technical Conunittee for Co1nn1uni-
cations and 'Transit of the League also "'"orked upon the 
san1e subject. The object of the conference 'vas to de-
Yise n1easures to re1nove interference with international 
transport and to take steps toward "rendering interna-
tional friction less frequent and diminishing the risk of 
·v;;ar." 'The conyentions agreed upon at the Barcelona 
Conference "~ere to apply in ti1ne of war "as far as 
u1ight be con1patibl2." The conference also recognized 
the possibility of special regulations depending upon 
regional or geographical circumstances. 
Transport in tran.sit.-The question of transport in 
transit had been defined as " transport which crosses a 
~tate, its points of departure and destination being out-
side that state." In the explanation of this term, the 
report says: 
"Transport of this kind is specially in need of international 
guarantees. In the case of the transport of exports and imports, 
n State which obstructs or prevents free movement of such trans-
lJort may indirectly cause serious prejudice to the economic re-
construction of the world. In this way it injures eYery State, but 
it directly injures only, either those exporting States the trans-
port of whose goods it preYents or obstructs in the course of im-
portation, or those importing States which may, for instance, be 
h1 need of raw materials, which the obstructing State possesses, 
2nd the export of which it prohibits. As regards transport in 
transit, on the other hand, any interruption or obstruction injures 
third parties, both the States which export and those which im-
port the products, the passage of which bas been prevented. Such 
~n interruption of traffic inevitably causes reprisals and counter-
effects, the results of which cannot be limited. 
"The International Convention of Barcelona on Freedom of 
Transit is, therefore, designed to prevent interruption or obstruc-
tion of this kind. "\Yith this object it provides-making due al-
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lowance, of course, for legitimate restrictions as regards police, 
national security, transport in war-time, etc., and also for the 
need of adapting its measures to the existing legal position, and 
to the local or regional conditions in various parts of the world-
for complete freedo111 of transit and complete equality of transit 
conditions." (League of Nations. A45.1921.VIII, p. 3.) 
The provisions in regard to transport in transit 'vere 
in principle to apply to traffic overland or by water. 
Transit through the LVetherlands, 1918.-Probleins 
arose during the \Vorld \Var in regard to the transit of 
goods and persons across Limburg from Ger1nany into 
Belgium. The American ~finister reported from The 
Hague, April 23, 1918, that: 
" Germany has within the last few days demanded of Holland : 
"(1) Removal of vexations customs examinations at the fron-
tiers; 
"(2) Passage of civil goods on the Limburg railways, frmn 
1\Iiinchen-Gladbach via Roermond to Antwerp; 
"(3) That the Rhine convention shall be understood as Ger-
many understands it, namely, that everything goes through in 
"·ar, as in peace; 
" ( 4) Unrestricted and uncontrolled transit of sand and gravel; 
.and-
" (5) That troops and munitions shall be allowed to pass through 
Limburg. 
''The best obtainable information is to the effect that den1and 
.uumber 5 has not actually been presented to the Dutch Govern-
ment, but that a statement regarding it was handed in by German 
Legation through ' mistake' with the four other demands. The 
Austrian :Minister, I learn from what I consider to be perfectly 
good authority, was informed by his German colleague of the 
presentation of the first four demands, and he learned about the 
fifth demand only through the British Charge d'Affairs, the Dutch 
l\Iinister of Foreign Affairs having told Sir -nr alter To,vnley of it 
and he having told a go-between. ~oudon, Treub and, so far as 
1 can learn, the members of the Government as a rule, and the 
nu tell Arn1y pretend publicly to believe that these German de-
mands are nothing but a bluff and that they are not in the least 
worried about the1n. Bluff or not, they produce a situation that 
T .... oudon states privately he considers serious. 
'' German policy is now controlled entirely fro1n General Head-
.quarters. Nobody doubts that they would order Holland entered 
4448-36--7 
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for their own purposes, at any time, if they thought they had any-
tl:iing to get thereby. The demand for the passage of troops and 
In~nitions through Limburg, if it should be made, would not 
differ in its effects from a demand for the use of the Scheidt, 
or a demand for the use of any other part of Dutch tenitory. 
The Dutch would resent it and though I find that Entente mili-
tary circles here believe or profess to believe that the Dutch Army 
would fight, there are other well-informed circles that think that 
the Dutch would not go beyond a breaking off of diplomatic rela-
tions with the Central Powers and the necessary formal protests." 
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1918, Suppleinent, . p. 1797.) 
1Vavigable waterways.-The Treaty of Versailles, June 
28: 1'919, in effect January 10, 1920, provided for certain 
navigable "~ater,vays in article 331: 
"The following rivers are declared international: 
"the Elbe (Labe) from its confluence with the Yltava (l\Ioldau), 
and the Vltava (~loldau) frmn Prague: 
"the Oder ( Odra) from its confluence with the Oppa; 
"the Niemen (Russstrom-1\Iemel-Niemen) from Grodno; 
" the Danube from Ulm; 
"and all navigable parts of these river systems which naturally 
provide more than one State with access to the sea, with or with-
out transshipment from one vessel to another; together with lateral 
canals and channels constructed either to duplicate or to improve 
naturally navigable sections of the specified river systems, or to 
('Onnect two naturally navigable sections of the same river." 
(1919 Naval "\Yar College, International Law Documents, p. 160.) 
.. A . t the Barcelona Conference in 1921 further sugges-
tions 'vere made which were embodied in a statute which 
defined rivers of international concern: 
"ARTICLE 1. In the application of the Statute, the following are 
declared to be navigable waterways of international concern: 
"1. All parts which are naturally navigable to and from the sea 
of a waterway which in its course, naturally navigable to and 
from the sea, separates or traverses different States, and also 
any part of any other waterway naturally navigable to and from 
the sea, which connects with the sea a watenvay naturally 
navigable which separates or traverses different States.'" 
(League of Nations Documents, 0.479.l\L327.1921.VIII, p. 17.) 
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A .. erial LV avigation.-The Treaty of Versailles, in pro~ 
viding for aerial navigation, in article 314 made specific 
provision in regard to Germany as follows : 
"The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall, while 
in transit to any foreign country whatever, enjoy the right of 
flying over the territory and territorial waters of Germany with-
out landing, subject always to any regulations which may be made 
by Germany, and which shall be applicable equally to the air-
craft of Germany and to those of the Allied and Associated 
countries." 
These conditions were regarded as imposed obligations 
to remain in force till January 1, 1923, unle$ Germany 
'vas earlier admitted to adhere to the Aerial Navigation 
Convention or had become a member of the League of 
Nations. 
Aircraft over the Straits.-A convention on the Regime 
of the Straits signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, provides 
for freedom of transit and of navigation by sea and by 
air of the Strait of Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and 
the Bosphorus. 'Turkey ratified this convention on 
l\farch 31, 1924, and British, Italian, Japanese, and 
:French ratifications were deposited later in 1924. 
In the annex stating the rules for passage of vessels 
and aircraft, there are provisions regulating the details 
o:f passage: 
"1. (b). In Time of 1Var, Turkey being Neutral. 
'·Complete freedom of navigation and passage by day and night 
under the same conditions as above. The duties and rights of 
Turkey as a neutral Power cannot authorize her to take any meas-
ures liable to interfere with navigation through the Straits, the 
waters of which, and the air above which, must remain entirely 
free in time of war, Turkey being neutral just as in time of 
peace." * * * 
" 2. (b) . In Time of War, Turkey being N eutraZ. 
"Complete freedom of passage by day and by night under any 
flag, without any formalities, or tax, or charge whatever, under 
the same limitations as in paragraph 2 (a). 
" However, these lhnitations will not be applicable to any bellig-
erent Power to the prejudice of its belligerent rights in the 
P.!ack Sea. 
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"The rights and duties of Turkey as a neutral Power cannot 
authorise her to take any measures liable to interfere with navi-
gntion through the Straits, the waters of which, and the air 
alwYe which, must remain entirely free in time of war, Turkey 
being neutral, just as in time of peace. 
" "\Yarships and military aircraft of belligerents will be for-
bidden to make any capture, to exercise the right of visit and 
search, or to carry out any other hostile act in the Straits. 
"As regards revictualling and carrying out repairs, war vessels 
will be subject to the terms of the Thirteenth Hague Convention 
cf 1907, dealing with maritime neutrality. 
":Military aircraft will receive in the Straits similar treatinent 
to that accorded under the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907 
to warships, pending the conclusion of an international Conven-
tion establishing the rules of neutrality for aircraft." (2 Hudson, 
International Legislation, pp. 1030, 1032.) 
Panan~a Oanal.-The procla1nation of the United 
States, N oYeinber 13, 1914, in regard to the Panama Canal 
contained rules in regard to the Canal: 1 
'• RULE 15. Aircraft of a belligerent power, public or private, 
:are forbidden to descend or arise within the jurisdiction of the 
United States at the Canal Zone, or to pass through the air 
spaces above the lands and waters within said jurisdiction. 
"RuLE 16. For the purpose of these rules the Canal Zone in-
-cludes the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent 
to the said cities." (1915 Naval "\Var College, International Law 
Topics, p. 11; 38 U. S. Stat., p. 2039.) 
After the United States becan1e a belligerent po,ver it 
\-vas necessary to amend these rules and on May 23, 1917, 
it was proclaimed that: / 
" RuLE 13. Aircraft, public or private, of a belligerent, other 
than the United States, are forbidden to descend or arise within 
the jurisdiction of the United States at the Canal Zone, or to pass 
through the air spaces above the lands and waters within said 
jurisdiction. 
"RuLE 14. For the purpose of these rules the Canal Zone in-
cludes the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent 
to the said cities." (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1917, Supplement 
II, p. 1267.) 
1 For canals in wartime, see 1930 Naval 'Var College, International 
Law Situations, pp. 115-134. 
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Suez Oanal, 1915.-A circular of May 1915 gave the 
Turkish point of vie·w in regard to the status of the Suez 
Canal: 
" Considering tlla t the British Government not only has failed 
to observe, in reference to the powers, the engagements to which 
it is bound by the convention of 1888, stipulating that no war 
vessel can remain in the Suez Canal, but also it is now fortifying 
the canal, while, on the other hand, the French Government, in 
Yiew of hostile action against the Ottoman En1pire, has landed 
troops in Egypt, the Imperial Ottoman Government, by reason of 
these facts, considers itself under the imperious necessity of tak-
ing military measures for the protection of the imperial territory, 
of which Egypt forms a part, and of extending hostilities to the 
Suez Canal. If such measures cause any injury whatever to neu-
tral vessels, it is thus evident" that the responsibility will be upon 
the French and British Governments." (1917 Naval War College, 
International Law Documents, p. 221.) 
Jfarginal air zone.-At the meeting of the Co1nmission 
of Jurists at The Hague in 1923, the Italian delegation 
proposed that along the seacoast there should be an air 
belt under national jurisdiction extending sea·ward ten 
1niles. This \vas not acceptable to the commission. It 
\vas argued that such a provision would give rise to con-
fusion, that jurisdiction in the air should be appurtenant 
to the subjacent jurisdiction, that it would enlarge the 
area of neutral obligation \Yithout "compensating advan-
tages", and would 1nake it more difficult for aircraft to 
deter1nine 'vith precision their location and to act accord-
ingly. It \Yas also pointed out that if the ten-mile air 
zone \vas adopted by a neutral, the belligerent aircraft 
n1ight alight on the sea and pass at once out of the neu-
tral jurisdiction. (1924 Naval 'Var College, Interna-
tjonal La'v Docu1nents, p. 152.) It has also been pointed 
out that under such a rule a yessel of \var, surface or 
sub1narine, 1night on passing \vithin ten n1iles of a neutral 
shore be exempt fro1n aerial attack~ and it should be 
pointed out that the aircraft \vould not be exempt from 
attack by anti-aircraft guns of the enemy vessels. 
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A statement of the Italian delegation nevertheless 
Jnaintained that: 
"3. From the point of view both of belligerent and of neutral 
States, there are reasons of the highest juridical and technical 
importance which make it indispensable to allow each State the 
power of including in its jurisdiction the atmospheric space to a 
distance of 10 miles from its coast. 
" 4. The difficulties resulting frmn the difference bet\veen the 
· Yddth of the marginal ~ir-belt and the width of national terri-
torial waters would not ~ee1n to be ~o. sericns as to render thl' 
Italian proposal unacceptable in practice. 
"5. In any case, there is no juridical obstacle to the fixing of 
tlle same width of space for the marginal air-belt as for territorial 
waters, the Italian Delegation being of opinion that international 
law, as generally recognised, contains no rule prohibiting a State 
fro1n extending its territorial waters to a distance of 10 sea-miles 
from its coasts." (Ibid, p. 153.) 
It is evident that 'vhile aerial navigation 1nay and does 
call for further regulations, such regulations should be 
based upon a con1prehensive understanding of all their 
b~arings upon accepted la,vs relating to other jurisdic-
tion. Action by a single state which would atte1npt to 
Inoclify the laws of 'var or neutrality in tin1e of 'var leads 
to confusion and Inay lead to an extension of the 'var to 
other states. 
Brazil and neutrality, 1933.-In the war bet,veen Bo-
livia and Paraguay, Brazil declared neutrality on l\fay 
23, 1933. In introducing the declaration there was a 
some,vhat long explanatory statement in 'vhich it 'vas 
said: 
"Considering, that not being a member of the League of Na-
tions, Brazil is not bound by the prescriptions of tl1e Pact, and 
that, having to affirm its neutrality, it is guided by international 
law, written and customary, and by the elevated spirit of justice 
and morality which civilization has inculcated in the conscienee 
ot cultured peoples 
"Considering, that the General Rules of Neutrality adopted by 
Brazil during the 'Vorld War, prior to having been drawn into 
it, and which were established by decree No. 11,037 of August 4, 
1914, and completed or modified by subsequent acts, do not fully 
satisfy the require1nents of the present moment, because, at the 
time of their publication war in another continent was conte1n-
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plated, the acts of belligerency on the sea being those which 
would nwst preoccupy the country, whereas now the strife is 
between neighboring and mediterranean nations, problems of river 
navigation have arisen, and while the international spirit has 
greatly increased during the past ~'ears ideas regarding war have 
cllanged considerably ; " * * * 
"Considering, ho·wever, that in order to settle the incidents 
which may arise and to govern the actions of Brazil and the 
Brazilians, there is the general idea of neutrality, which consists 
in the neutral State abstaining from taking part directly or in-
directly in the action of the belligerents; in not disturbing in any 
tvay war operations occurring outside of its territory; in not allow-
ir.g, \Vithin it, acts of hostility; and in having assured the free-
dOin of its peaceful commerce, the expression of its sovereignty, 
which war abroad cannot reasonably limit; deducing from this 
last proposition that only the normal purpose of the 1nerchandise 
and its destiny, can influence its classification as hostile or 
innocent;". 
vVhile the rules in regard to neutrality issued under 
the declaration contained the ordinary provisions in re-
gard to the use oi Brazilian waters by vessels of 'var, there 
were also such provisions as the follo,ving: 
"ARTICLE 5. It is forbidden to the belligerents to make on the 
land, river, or maritime territory of the United States of Brazil, a 
base of war operations or to practice acts which may constitute a 
violation of Brazilian neutrality." 
"ARTICLE 21. Belligerent airplanes may not fly over the terri-
tory or jurisdictional waters of Brazil without previous authoriza-
tion. Those not authorized that land on Brazilian territory or 
\Yaters will be detained. 
"l\filitary airplanes will not be given authorization to fly over 
Brazilian territory." 
Neutralization of maritime areas.-Proposals were made 
early in the World War to close considerable areas of the 
Atlantic Ocean to belligerents or to apply the ordinary 
rules of neutrality according to a geographical interpre-
tation. It was suggested that a neutral zone in the At-
lantic from the American coast to the meridian of Cape 
Verde be established to prevent interJerence with Ameri-
can commerce. This proposition 'vas considered by the 
Chilean GoYernn1ent and the follo·wing reply "~as made: 
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"This GoYernment bas already been seeking means to dhninish 
the disturbances which the actiYities of the belligerents off the 
American coasts haYe been causing to the malitime commerce of 
the nations of this continent, and had, in the first place, con-
sidered the idea of fixing a neutral zone within which said com-
Inerce would not be disturbed. Nevertheless, a careful study of 
the question leads tne to think that a 1neasure of this nature will 
not be accepted by the GoYerntnent of Great Britain, and that, 
even thougb it were accepted by that Government, it would not 
be productiYe of any appreciable results in the sense desired. As 
a n1atter of fact, it seems doubtful that the British Government 
would accept a Ineasure which in reality would be of much 
greater profit to Germany, whose merchant marine is now totally 
paralyzed, than to England whicb still maintains a Inaritime 
moYement of some vitality in American waters. On the other 
hand, the efficacy of such a 1neasure would have Yery little weight 
on the commercial interchange betw.een Europe and America, 
because the danger would continue beyond the neutral zone, 
that is to say, in European waters wherein the situation of 
belligerent ships would ren1ain as it is to-day. Consequently, the 
advantages of the measure would be restricted to the inter-
cllange bet"·een American countries. Finally, the enormous ex-
tent of the neutral zone would render the surveillance required by 
our neutral .duties still much n1ore difficult and costly than it is 
today, unless the measure were to be a merely illusory one." 
(Foreign Relations, U.S., 1914, Supplement, p. 436.) 
There was also so1ne discussion as to the joint action 
of the A1nerican states as to a proposition to the belli-
gerents that " sections of the Southern Atlantic and Pa-
cific should be closed to naval 'varfare and that the bel-
ligerents should co1ne to some agreement 'vith the Union 
as to the protection of neutral shipping." 
The Pan American Union on December 8, 1914, passed 
a resolution favoring a com1nission to study "the prob-
l(~ms presented by the present European 'Var " particu-
larly as regards neutral relations. 
The Peruvian Minister at Washington in a coinmunica-
tion o£ December 12, 1914, 1nentioned the proposal o£ 
';an American continental agreement with the object of itnpos-
ing on belligerents for the first time respect for the inviolability 
of the American highways of commerce, as a new principle of 
international law arising out of the needs of a situation created by 
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the devastating clash of such formidable elements of force and 
destruction. 
"The fundamental object of the agreement which the Peruvian 
Governnwnt is seeking once clearly determined, there can enter 
into consideration no possibility that such an agreement may prove 
injurious to this or that belligerent and meet with its more or 
less open opposition. Since all that we seek is to prevent vio-
lent aggressions from being carried beyond their proper theatre 
to the enormous distance at which America lies, and since in sup-
port thereof a pacific right of self-preservation is invoked, which 
is obviously more worthy of respect than the right of destruc-
tion and annihilation which each belligerent claims against his 
enemy, there is no occasion to ask which of the combatants will 
accept it. Let us proclaim, maintain, and enforce the right of 
the neutral nations, consolidated in the form of a continental 
agreement, to keep hostilities· away from geographical areas not 
involved in th~ natural influences and effects of the war, where 
prevails a normal, valuable, and peaceful trade, which is experi-
encing disastrous effects to the extent of crisis and ruin, daily 
aggravated by the continuance of such a state of things. The 
territorial waters fiction and, to a certain degree, the very right 
of asylum for ships of the belligerent countries in neutral harbors, 
have as their true foundation the safeguarding of moral and 
physical interests whose defense could not be subordinated to the 
right of aggression, if it may be so called, of one belligerent 
against the other. Respect of territorial waters and of vessels 
.ac·corded asylum was enforced without ascertaining 'vho n1ight 
complain against those principles being put in practice; it was 
euough to know that they were the result of justified necessity, 
and the principles have grown to the estate of a right and of a 
Tight that is compulsory." (Ibid., p. 445.) 
In some o£ the South American states such proposi-
6ons as related to neutralization met with little response 
and the American Legation in Brazil reported on Decem-
ber 11', 1914: 
" The members of the Foreign Office are particularly jubilant 
ever what is considered a decided success for their initiative. In 
business circles and among those not directly connected with the 
Government it must be confessed that there is no special en-
thusiasnl on this subject as it seems to be the general opinion 
that little of practical importance can be acco1nplished by the 
Pan American Union in the premises. Now that the German war 
Yessels in this part of the \Yorld haYe been destroyed, it seems to 
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he the impression among practical persons that there is at present 
no further need for the good offices of the union." (Ibid., p. 452.) 
Attitude of United States toward S1oitzerland.-The 
neutralization of Sw·itzerland had been generally re-
spected during the \\rorld \Var, and 8\vitzerland had 
shown a disposition to n1aintain its neutrality by force 
'Yhen necessary. While the United States was not a party 
to the neutralization treaties in regard to 8\vitzerland, it 
1nade kno,Yn its attitude. 
"'YASHINGTO~, No&c1nbcr 30, 1917', 5 JJ.m. 
"1171. You are instructed to fonnally present the following 
communication to the l\linister of Foreign Affairs : 
" 'In Yiew of the presence of American forces in Europe engaged 
in the prosecution of tile war against the Imperial German Govern-
ment, the Government of the United States deems it appropriate 
to announce for the assurance of the Swiss Confeaeration and in 
harmony with t'he attitude of the co-belligerents of the United 
States in Europe, that the United States will not fail to observe 
the principle of neutrality applicable to Switzerland and the in-
violability of its territory, so long as the neutrality of Switzerland 
is maintained by the Confederation and respected by the enemy. 
Lansing.' " 
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1917, Supplement 2, Yol. I, p. 758.) 
Li1nitin g areas of hostilities.-Early in August 1914 
China raised the question as to whether European bellig-
erents might consent " not to engage in hostilities either 
in Chinese territory and 1narginal waters, or in adjacent 
leased territories." Propositions "concerning the pos-
sible neutralization of the Pacific Ocean " \Yere advanced. 
There 'vas in early August a general desire for the Jnain-
tenance of the status quo in the Far East. On August 13 
the German GoYerninent said: 
" 1. Germany does not seek war with Japan. 
"2. If Japan, on account of the treaty with England, asks that 
Gerinany do nothing against English colonies, warships, or com-
merce in Ea~t, Germany will assent in return for corresponding 
promise from England. 
"3. England and Germany to reciprocally agree that either all 
warships of both in East leaYe eastern waters or remain inactive 
as against the other, if remaining there. 
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"4 .. Japan, England, and Germany to agree that none of these 
three shall attack warships, colonies, territory, or con1merce of 
any of the others in the East. 
"5. The East to mean all lands and seas between parallels 
Lon don 90 east and all Pacific to Cape Horn. 
'" Notify German Ambassador in Tokyo. 
" If this zone is too large, smaller limits will be accepted." 
(Foreign Relation~, U. S., 1914, Sp.pplen1ent, p. 169.) 
Japan on August 15 proposed to Germany : 
"(1) To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and Chinese 
waters German men-of-war and armed Yessel~ of all kinds and to 
(Usarm at once those which cannot be so withdra,vn. 
"(2) To deliver on a d~te not later than September 15, 191-!, 
to the Imperial .Japanese aut.horities without condition or compen-
sation the entire leased territory of Kiaocho'\\T, with a Yiew to 
eventual restoration of the same to China. 
"The Imperial Japanese Government announce at the same time 
that in the event of their not receiving by noon, August 23, 1914, 
the answer of the Imperial German Government signifying an 
'Jnconditional acceptance of the aboYe advice offered by the Im-
pe-rial Japanese Government, they will be compelled to take such 
action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation." (Ibid, 
fJ. 170.) 
On August 18 the British charge d'affaires in Wash-
ington coininunicated to the Secretary o:f State the :fol-
lowing memorandum, 
"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan having been in 
communication with each other are of opinion that it is necessary 
for each to take action to protect the general interests in the Far 
East contemplated by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, keeping spe-
cially in Yiew the independence and integrity of China as provided 
for in that agreen1ent. 
"It is understood that the action of Japan w·ill not extend to 
the Pacific Ocean lJeyond the China Seas, except in so far as it 
may be necessary to protect .Japanese shipping lines in the Pa-
cific, nor beyond Asia tic waters westward of the China Seas, nor 
to any foreign territory except territory in German occupation on 
the continent of eastern Asia." (Ibid., p. 171.) 
On .A.ugust 23 the Japanese informed the United States 
that as Germany had :failed to make anS\Yer to the J ap-
anese note o:f August 15, a state o:f \Var existed between 
Japan and Gern1any :from noon August 23, 1914. 
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In spite of discussion of li1niting the area of hostili-
ties, no agreement could be reached. 
Li1nits of belligerent rights.-"\Vhen Ger1nany issued on 
February 4, 1915, the 'var zone procla1nation stating that 
neutral vessels exposed the1nselves to danger in the 'va-
ters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland and in the 
English Channel, the Unit~d States sent a note of pro-
test. In this note of February 10~ 1915, it 'vas said: 
"It is of course not neces~ary to remind tlle German Govern-
ment that the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral 
vessels on the high seas is liinited to visit and search, unless a 
blockade is proclaimed and effectively maintained, which this 
Government does not understand to be proposed in this case. To 
declare or exercise a right to attack and destroy any vessel enter-
ing a prescribed area of the high seas without first certainly de-
termining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character 
of its cargo \YOuld be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare 
that this Govern1nent is reluctant to believe that the llnperial 
Govennnent of Gennany in this case conten1plates it as possible. 
The suspicion that ene1ny ships are using neutral flags improp-
erly can create no just presumption that all ships traversing a 
prescribed area are subject to the same suspidon. It is to deter-
mine exactly such questions that this Government understands 
the right of visit and search to have been recognized." (Foreign 
Helations, U. S., 1915, Supplement, p. 98.) 
Foreign interpretation of nati01lal duties.-Belligerent 
rjghts and duties as well as neutral rights and duties rest 
upon international law. Belligerents have often at-
teinpted to extend their rights and· neutral duties even by 
suggesting that neutrals take action in regard to oppos-
ing belligerents which might be beyond neutral obliga-
tions. 
On January 30, 1917, the N or,vegian Govern1nent by a 
Royal Ordinance prescribed that after February 6, 1917: 
" Suumarines, equipped for use in war, and belonging to a belli-
gerent power, may not be navigated or remain in Norwegian terri-
torial waters. Breach of this prohibition will render such ves-
sels liable to attack by armed force without previous warning. 
" This prohibition shall not prevent submarines fron1 seeking 
Norwegian territorial waters on account of stress of weather, or 
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damage, or in order to save human life; when within territorial 
waters in such cases the vessel shall be kept at the surface and 
shall fly her national flag and also the international signal indi-
cating the reason of her presence. As soon as the reasons justi-
f~·ing the arrival of the vessel are no longer present, she shall 
(1epart from territorial waters." (1917 Naval vVar College, In-
ternational Law Documents, p. 195.) 
The British and A1nerican Governn1ents had raised 
question as to the 1neasures taken to enforce this ordi-
nance. To the Government o£ the United States in reply 
to a suggestion o£ a fe'v days previous that Norwegian 
waters be mined against German submarines in addition 
to the patrolling of the 'vaters, the Minister o£ Foreign 
Affairs on August 20, 191'8, said: 
"'Vith reference to the statement of the American Govenunent 
that the Norwegian Government has not insisted on impartial 
<"Ompliance with the Norwegian resolution in question, and that 
the measures hitherto adopted have only been nominal, and in 
Yiew of the recommendation of the American Government to the 
Norwegian Government to take such new and effectiYe measures 
n~ will effectually vrevent the vassage of German submarines 
through Norwegian territorial waters, the Norwegian Government 
uesires to point [out] the following: 
"The duties imposed in time of war by international law on a 
neutral state in respect of its territorial waters consist, partly 
in the obligation that it shall prevent by all the means at its 
disposal any of the belligerents utilizing them for operations of 
war or as a base there for, and partly in the obligation that it 
shall enforce upon all the belligerents equally the observance of 
the regulations it issues. No matter what may flow from these 
cbligations, none of the belligerents is justified by international 
law in demanding that special measures be taken by the neutral 
state in its own territorial waters. The Norwegian Govenunent 
i~ conYinced that it has unquestionably fulfilled its obligations in 
respect of both the above-mentioned points. Just as its efforts 
since the commencement of the war· have been directed towards 
the maintenance of an inviolable neutrality, so it is still its firm 
intention to Inaintain it in the future and to avoid any step which 
may be considered as a deviation from this attitude. 
"The above-mentioned resolution of January 30, 1917, whirh 
concerns the passage through and sojourn in territorial waters. 
of submarines, is solely based on consideration of Norwegian in-
terest and is obviously not intended to facilitate the war meas-
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ures of one or other of the belligerents. Neither does it enjoin 
upon Norway any other obligation under international law than 
that of enforcing the resolution equally upon all parties concerned 
which the Norwegian Government, as already mentioned, is con-
vinced that it has done. It cannot concede the right to any state 
1 o demand special 1neasures in order to insure its observance. 
"It will, however, be calculated to call forth the serious con-
sideration of the Norwegian Government if it be established that 
German submarines have utilized Norwegian territorial waters 
ns a passage in violation of the said resolution. The Norwegian 
Government must request the American Government for more 
detailed information in regard to the cases which the latter has 
in n1incl relative to the appearance of German submarines in Xor-
wegian territorial waters. The Norwegian Government would ap-
preciate as con1plete information as possible, such as fuller details 
:1~ to the time and place and the certainty that the submarines in 
question were Gern1an in each case, besides information as to the 
state of the weather. 
"When the Norwegian Government receives the infonnation re-
ferred to from the American Government, it will immediately take 
into cousideration [the measures] occasioned thereby in the in-
terests of Norway and the Government might then feel called 
upon to take n1easures for sharper protection of Norwegian terri-
torial waters. But it must definitely insist that it is its incontest-
able right by international law to determine for itself what 
measures should be taken in this respect." (Foreign Relations, 
U. S., 1918, Supplement I, vol. II, p. 1779.) 
Position of state D.-While the geographical conti-
guity of states X, Y, and D might give rise to certain 
doubts as to the neutral obligations of state D, this con-
tiguity would not affect the rights of X and Y under a 
declaration of war. 
The vessels of war of X or of Y might visit and search 
the merchant vessels of state D or of any neutral state. 
If a vessel of war of state Y should capture a merchant 
Yessel of D or of a neutqtl state, the vessel of war might 
find difficulty in bringing it to a prize court and other 
problems might arise but it is possible that these might 
not arise and it 'vould be for states Y and D to adjust 
such difficulties aft€r they arise rather than for state D 
to presume in advance to declare the rights of Y. It is 
clear that state D could not legally deter1nine the bellig-
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erent rights of state X nor could state D lawfully refuse 
to recognize these rights. The rights in regard to con-
traband, continuous voyage, unneutral service, and other 
belligerent rights could not be denied to state X by 
state D. 
As a state not a party to the 'var, state D 'vould not be 
at liberty to permit indefinite sojourn in its ports of ves-
sels of war or to tolerate any act 'vithin its jurisdiction 
'vhich would constitute a nonfulfillment of neutral duties. 
~Ianifestly from its geographical position, state Y may 
be under certain disadvantages when at war with a mari-
time state, but the laws of war and of neutrality are not 
conditioned upon premises of a geographical nature 
though one or the other of the belligerents may be more 
strategically at an advantage on account of its location. 
SOLUTION 
(a) State A may lawfully in its proclamation of neu-
trality exclude all vessels of 'var and vessels assimilated 
thereto. This would apply to armed merchant vessels, 
but ordinarily not to unarmed merchant vessels whether 
ur not decks had been strengthened. 
(b) State B may lawfully refuse to admit vessels of 
war of X and Y with prize except on account of unsea-
w·orthiness, stress of weather, or lack of fuel or supplies. 
(c) State 0 may lawfully refuse to permit aircraft of 
Y to fly. over its territory to a vessel of Y which is at sea. 
(d) State D may not lawfully refuse to grant to X 
and Y rights 'vhich might flow from a declaration of war 
ur refuse to accept any neutral obligations so far as aerial 
or maritime acts are concerned though the geographical 
location of state D might make special regulations justi-
fiable. 

